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The Impact of European Union Membership on Levels of Corruption
I.

Introduction

On October 4, 2009, the PASOK (Socialist) Party of Greece was ushered into power with the
election of their candidate, George Papandreou, as prime minister. Two months later, the new
PASOK Government announced that the projected budget deficit for 2009 was 12.7% of GDP,
double the old 2009 deficit estimate of 6.7% of GDP and over 9 percentage points above the 3%
deficit-to-GDP ratio allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact for Eurozone member countries.1
The 12.7% estimate was later adjusted upward to 15.4%,2 and by early 2010, several credit-rating
agencies had re-classified Greece’s sovereign debt to “junk status.”3 Over the next few years, the
financial crisis in Greece became increasingly dire as Greece received 242.8 billion euros in loans
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU), underwent the largest
debt restructuring in history, and became the first developed nation to default on the IMF.45
While the reasons for the debt crisis in Greece are disparate and complex, the widespread
presence of corruption in Greece has been noted as a factor that contributed to the situation.6
Nelson, Belkin, and Mix acknowledge that the decrease in borrowing rates with the Greek adoption
of the Euro, the investor confidence inspired by Greek ratification of the Stability and Growth
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Pact, as well as the government borrowing to pay for budget deficits and net imports, were all
important elements resulting in the Greek Crisis.7 Nelson et al. also emphasize, however, the
impact of the “deeply entrenched” corruption in the Greek economy and Greek society in the form
of “…a large and inefficient public administration, endemic tax evasion, and widespread political
clientelism.”8
The issue of widespread corruption, unfortunately, is not limited to Greece alone. In her
2014 Anti-Corruption Report to the European Council and the European Parliament, E.U. Trade
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström stated that “the extent of [corruption] in Europe is breathtaking”
and costing the E.U. economy “at least €120 billion annually (equivalent to $162 billion).”910 The
data describes reports of high levels of corruption in Eastern European members and relatively
new E.U. members, such as Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania.11 Indications
of high corruption, however, were also seen in founding E.U. members, such as Spain, Portugal,
Italy, and Ireland.12
These findings question the anti-corruption efficacy of European Union institutions and
guidelines. All applicant nations wishing to accede to the E.U. must adopt anti-corruption
legislation and practices, establish “watchdog” institutions, and demonstrate an acceptable level
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of transparency in government operations.13 The 2014 E.U. Commission Anti-Corruption Report
acknowledges this when it states:
EU Member States have in place most of the necessary legal
instruments and institutions to prevent and fight corruption.
However, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across the. EU.
Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic
problems are not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant
institutions do not always have sufficient capacity to enforce the
rules. Declared intentions are still too distant from concrete results,
and genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be
missing.14
The report details the impact of these shortcomings with a few notable statistics. For
example, 26% of E.U. citizens surveyed reported that they are personally affected by corruption.15
Furthermore, 73% of those surveyed indicated that a bribe or connection was the best way to obtain
a public service and only 23% thought that their government was effectively addressing
corruption.16
Corruption costs the E.U. economy in a variety of ways, and the estimated loss due to
corruption (€120 billion) is only a little less than the 2014 agreed E.U. budget of €145 billion
(estimated in 2015 figures).17 The main costs come through the loss of tax revenues and foreign
investment.1819 It is important to note that the tax revenue and foreign investment loss factored not
only in the Greek Crises, but also in the developing debt crises in Ireland and Portugal in 2009 that
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spread to Spain and Italy in 2012.20 Given the global ramifications of the Greek Crisis, as well as
the impact of the E.U. economy of the common market, it is imperative that the E.U. effectively
address and lower the incidence of corruption among its members.
The ostensible aim of the European Union is to improve the quality of life for the citizens of
the member countries. The treaties and agreements made amongst the members are crafted to allow
Europeans to enjoy greater economic prosperity and political stability through improved and
streamlined governmental processes within the union. The governing documents of the European
Union commits the organization to transparency and ethical practices in government operations,
as explicitly stated and detailed in the 11th article of the 2007 Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union.21 The continued instances of corruption are counter to the codified aims of the
E.U. as well as the official efforts to eradicate corruption that E.U. institutions and member states
are required to undertake. The goal of this study is to empirically determine the effect of E.U.
membership on levels of corruption, as the legitimacy of the E.U.’s mission to raise the living
standards of Europeans rests in part with the efficacy of E.U. anti-corruption measures. As the
recent debt crises suggest, the benefit of E.U. membership in terms of addressing corrupt
governance—and the resultant financial emergencies—may not be as robust and effective as it
should be.
II.

Previous Literature

The literature on the subject of economic factors of corruption is extensive, so I confined my
literature review to recent papers and research that aided me in building my model. I was unable
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to find many other papers that examined the specific role of European Union membership on levels
of corruption in a country. Thus, I focused on examining research that would aid in identifying
necessary independent variables.
Wijaynato Wijayanto (2007) authored the paper that directly influenced this study and the
development of the regression used to determine the impact of E.U. membership on corruption.
His paper, titled “Economic, Political and Social Factors Affecting Corruption: A Cross Country
Analysis,” incorporates most of the scholarship and sources later discussed in this paper and used
in the construction of this study’s regression. Wijaynato’s paper is unique in that includes two
variables, quality of regulation and urban population, which have never been used in any previous
studies. This paper was part of his dissertation at Georgetown University for his Masters in Public
Policy. He uses World Bank data from 133 countries around the world for five years, 1996, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004. Wijayanto states that high-quality regulation created by a government can act
as an anticorruption mechanism, given that efficient regulation allows a country to function more
effectively.22 In addition, the proportion of urban population may also have positive relationship
with control of corruption, as urban citizens tend to be better educated and more involved in civic
activity.23 Wijayanto, however, found that the urban population variable was not significant.24
Daniel Treisman (2000) finds that effective, efficient democracy strengthens the control of
corruption score, as a result of limiting corruption-inducing behavior in public officials.25 This
article analyzes various factors that could be related to levels of "perceived corruption.” He
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compiled his data from business risk surveys for the early-1980s and mid-1990s. His main findings
were Countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies, and
more effective democracies were rated “less corrupt.”26
Lindita Camaj (2012) finds that press freedom and democracy strengthen each other, and that
this is particularly the case when press freedom exists in the framework of what the author defines
as a “strong civil society.” She measures the relationship between media freedom and corruption,
dividing the media’s role into what she defines as vertical accountability (electoral
competitiveness, civil society, and voter turnout) and horizontal accountability (judicial
independence and political system).27 She finds a positive relationship between democracy quality
and transparency. Her results also suggest a strong association between high levels of media
freedom with low levels of corruption.28
In addition, Amos Brunetti and Bruno Weder (1999) reinforce Camaj’s findings and their data
also suggest that the association between media freedom and corruption is stronger in countries
with parliamentary systems than in those with presidential systems. They also find that this impact
amplifies as the degree of judiciary independence increases.29 Both Brunetti and Weder and Camaj
utilize two decades of Press Freedom data from Freedom house.
Press freedom enables media to publish balanced news about the government, including
news about corruption by government officers. A strong and viable Press creates accountability
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source for the general public. This is in line with Klitgaard’s (1999) statement in his book,
Controlling Corruption, that corruption levels increase with a government-dominated media and
decrease when an un-censored press focuses on government accountability.30
Fatic Aleksandar (2000) finds that stability is an important factor in determining whether
the national environment is conducive to corruption or not.31 Stable political, economic and
social elements allow the government and the citizens to create and perpetuate transparent
mechanisms of corruption monitoring, assessment, and control.32 Aleksandar continues with
findings indicating that corruption is rampant in countries in Southeast Europe that underwent
political transition.33 Aleksandar states that this transition is accompanied by political, economic
and social instability. Situations of instability may make corruption the only available option for
citizens, including government officers, to survive.34 Reading from Aleksandar’s analysis
indicates that political stability may have positive relationship with the control of corruption.35
James Rauch and Peter Evans (2000) conducted a study on bureaucratic quality and
corruption.36 They look at how the recruitment and promotion process in the bureaucracy is
based on meritocracy or on nepotism, as they argue that less nepotism tends to reduce the
collusion and power abuse among bureaucrats.37 They test this point by constructing an index of
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meritocratic recruitment and promotion. They show that it is significantly associated with
corruption in their sample of less developed countries.38
Carlos Liete and Jens Weidmann (1999) find a strong association with natural resource
abundance and rent seeking behavior.39 They also find that the extent of corruption relies mainly
on natural resource abundance, governmental policies, and how bureaucratic power is
concentrated.40 They also measure corruption by using corruption scores provided by the
International Country Risk Guide.41 Their natural resource measure is given as the share of
natural resource exports in a country’s GNP.42
Finally, I examined a working paper written by Pomona College researcher Cristina
Waggoner-Nicolescu and co-researcher Shawn Bowler. They specifically look at the impact of
what they define as “Political Conditionality,” or the conditions attached to trade agreements and
aid programs the E.U. has with other nations.43 This includes nations who are in the E.U. or in the
process of joining the EU. They are specifically interested in how these stipulations and conditions
that the E.U. puts into the agreements, such as election reform or increases in public financial
transparency, impacts corruption. They look at three different types of association with the EU,
including Membership, Negotiation, and ENP Action Plan (or European Neighbor Policy). They
conduct several different regressions with several different types of data. They consistently find
that the levels of corruption decrease in country when the country holds a conditional offer of E.U.
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membership, contingent on that country insituting certain reforms, but that levels of corruption
rise again after that country is accepted and officially added to the EU.44
Waggoner-Nicolescu and Bowler also include demographic binaries for cultural factors,
such as Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox, as they cite Treisman when they theorize that some faith
traditions, such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, are more hierarchal and discourage civic
participation—creating environments conducive to government corruption. They find in several
of their regressions that both Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy have large effects on increasing
corruption, both at the 99% significance level.45

III.

Methodology
Data
The dataset for this paper contains 13 independent variables composed of 6 Worldwide

Governance Indicators, 4 Global Development Indicators, and 3 demographic binary variables.
Excepting the 3 demographic variables, all the data for my variables come from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the World Development Indicators datasets. For
this study, I used only the countries from the European/Central Asian Region.46
The World Bank compiles data from a variety of officially recognized and respected
international sources to generate the Worldwide Governance Indicators, originally developed by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010).47 According to an official statement released on the
database website, “[the aggregated indicators] are based on over 30 individual data sources
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produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, and private sector firms.48 These sources include Freedom House,
Transparency International, Global Competitiveness Report, the European Bank for
Reconstruction, Global Integrity Index, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development
Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, the Bertelsman Foundation,
Reporters Without Borders, and the Commercial Business Information Providers.49 The data
from these sources are treated using a statistical technique known as Unobserved Components
model to combine the data into standard, comparable units.50
I also use country demographic variables from the World Development Index. This is the
primary collection of World Bank data for development and demographic information on
countries throughout the world.51 This database includes a variety of indices on national and
regional financial, commercial, population, and environmental characteristics.52
Data Cleaning
There were 855 initial observations in 54 European and Central Asian countries initially
included in the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset. This number, however, later reduced
to 372 observations of 31 countries after countries were dropped due to missing or insufficient
data.
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Variables
These units of data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators are then sorted into six
broad governance categories (or variables) known as Voice and Accountability (renamed Free
Press in this study), Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (renamed Political
Stability), Government Effectiveness (renamed Effective Governance), Regulatory Quality, Rule
of Law, and Control of Corruption.53
The Control of Corruption variable is my dependent variable. Control of Corruption
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Control of Corruption
encompasses a range of corrupt activities, as well as the event of “capture” of the state by private
interests.54 This variable is a 5-point scale whose scores range roughly from -2.5 (indicating most
corrupt) to 2.5 (indicating least corrupt) with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For
reference, Finland’s 2012 score was 2.55, indicating a very low level of corruption. Georgia’s
control of corruption score in 2002, conversely, was -1.13. This indicates a very high level of
corruption.
EU Member is my key independent variable. E.U. Member is a binary variable where the
value of E.U. Member is 1 if the country was a member of the European Union for that year and
0 if the country was not member of the E.U. for that year.
From the World Development Indicators dataset, I incorporated data for the factors of
Urban Population and the Percent of Natural Resources Rents of GDP. While Wijaynato did not
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find Urban Population to be significant, I included this variable in the study due to the variation
in urban demographics among European countries.
Finally, I included certain cultural demographic variables for religious traditions in
European countries. I am very intrigued by the results found by Waggonner-Nicolescu and
Bowler, and I am interested gauging the impact of historically Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox
Christian traditions. These cultural variables are binaries, with the Islamic variable left out. For
the complete list of variables, please see Table 1.

Table 1.
Variable

Source

Description

Control of Corruption

WGI55

EU Member
Effective Governance

European
Commission56
WGI

Political Stability

WGI

Regulation Quality

WGI

Rule of Law

WGI

Freedom of Press

WGI

GDP per Capita

WDI57

Score, indicating the control corruption in each
country, ranging from -2.5 (most corrupt)
to +2.5 (least corrupt).
Binary, indicating 0 if not an E.U. member for respective
year and 1 if an E.U. member in that year
Score, indicating effectiveness of governmental operation,
ranging from -2.5 (very ineffective) to +2.5 (very effective)
Score, indicating political stability, ranging from -2.5 (very
unstable) to +2.5 (very stable)
Score, indicating the quality of regulation in the
country ranging from -2.5 (lowest quality)
to +2.5 (highest quality)
Score, indicating the quality of justice system, ranging from
-2.5 (low quality) to +2.5 (high quality)
Score, indicating freedom of speech and freedom of press,
ranging from -2.5 (not very free) to +2.5 (very free)
Indicates the GDP per Capita for a Country per year

Unemployment Rate

WDI

Nat Resource GDP

WDI

Urban Population

WDI

Catholic

CIA World
Factbook58
CIA World
Factbook
CIA World
Factbook

Protestant
Orthodox

55

Indicates the ratio between the unemployed and employed
populations of labor force per country per year
The ratio between rents from natural resources
(i.e. oil, gas, mineral, other resources ) and other activity to
a country’s total GDP.
Indicates the fraction of the country’s population that lives
in an Urban Area.
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Catholic
Country and 0 if not.
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Protestant
Country and 0 if not.
Binary, indicating 1 if country is a Historically Orthodox
Country and 0 if not.
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Countries
This study incorporates thirty-one countries in Europe and Central Asia from 2002 to
2013. The countries include fourteen countries who were E.U. members at the onset of the study,
nine countries who join the E.U. during the course of the study,59 and seven countries that are not
E.U. members.60 Of the nine countries that join the E.U. during the study, six countries were
added during the 2004 enlargement of the EU,61 two countries were added from the 2007
Enlargement,62 and one country was added from the 2013 Enlargement.63 Please see Figure 1.
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60
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61
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Figure 1.

Summary Statistics
Table 2 details the summary statistics of my variables.
Table 2.
Variable

Mean

St. Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Corruption

0.623655

1.064515

-1.138725

2.552692

EU Member

0.9316476

0.4851205

0

1

Effective Governance

1.020473

0.8778297

-0.8864411

2.356591

Political Stability

0.5940804

0.6797157

-1.46215

1.664877

Regulation Quality

1.033927

0.6784107

-0.81443

1.920921

Rule of Law

0.9232398

0.9077001

-1.167023

1.99964

Freedom of Press

0.9624432

0.6625328

-1.013167

1.82637

GDP per Capita

28186.15

20995.02

670.1845

86129.38

Unemployment Rate

9.053983

6.084385

2.3

37.3

Nat Resource GDP

2.65139

5.878833

0

39.1455

Urban Population

71.38512

12.57945

44.857

97.776

Catholic

0.5215054

0.5002101

0

1

Protestant

0.2580645

0.438159

0

1

Orthodox

0.2190645

0.438159

0

1

No. of Observations

372

The mean for E.U. Member is 0.93, which shows that 93% of the countries in the sample
were E.U. members or became E.U. members during the selected time range and demonstrated a
standard deviation of 0.4851.
My average Control of Corruption score is 0.623655, meaning that the countries in my
sample from 2002 to 2013 leaned slightly less corrupt on average.
Model
I included regional-level fixed effects into my model in order to account for unobservable
heterogeneity between different regions across time. For the purposes of this study, these regions
are defined as Northwest, Mediterranean, Eastern, and Other.
Building on the model developed by Wijaynato, I thus estimate my model to observe the
effect membership in the E.U. has on levels of corruption within a country. The basic
specification for the model is as follows:
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏 𝐄𝐔_𝐌𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐭 +
𝛃𝟑 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒 𝐅𝐫𝐞𝐞_𝐒𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟓 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐭 +
𝛃𝟔 𝐆𝐃𝐏_𝐩𝐞𝐫_𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟕 𝐑𝐮𝐥𝐞_𝐨𝐟_𝐋𝐚𝐰𝐢𝐭 +
𝛃𝟖 𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟗 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐢𝐭 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐔𝐫𝐛𝐚𝐧_𝐏𝐨𝐩𝐢𝐭 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭_𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥_𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬_𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 +
𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝐇𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲_𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝐇𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲_𝐂𝐚𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑭𝑬 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭

IV.

Results

Table 3 summarizes the regression results.
Table 3.
Variable

Coefficient

St. Error (Robust)

P-Value

EU Member

-0.1087836***

0.0335655

0.001

Effective Governance

0.5391492***

0.0580785

0.000

Political Stability

-0.0667007**

0.0350888

0.058

Regulation Quality

0.017878

0.0640482

0.780

Rule of Law

0.4197714***

0.074219

0.000

Freedom of Press

0.0552318

0.072617

0.447

GDP per Capita

7.74e-06***

1.31e-06

0.000

Unemployment Rate

-0.000955

0.0020959

0.649

Nat. Resource GDP

-0.0094065***

0.0026768

0.000

Urban Population

-0.0022343

0.0013693

0.104

Catholic

-0.0223395

0.0400301

0.577

Protestant

0.3214475***

0.0443816

0.000

Orthodox

0.00603

0.0615436

0.922

No. of Observations

372

R Squared

0.9698

Adj. R Squared

0.9685

***Significant at the 99% Level, **Significant at the 95% Level, *Significant at the 90% Level

I find that E.U. Membership does impact the level of corruption, and is statistically
significant at the 99% level. The E.U. Membership variable magnitude of -0.108 indicates that
membership in the E.U. will decrease a country’s Corruption score by roughly 0.11 points. While
this value may seem small, this is actually a much larger effect in the context of the possible 5point score range (from -2.5 to 2.5).
I was expecting E.U. Membership to have a negligible impact on the Control of
Corruption. The negative effect may be due to the situation referenced by Cecilia Malmström in
which she claims that while member countries have the correct practices and institutions in
place, these anti-corruption measures are not being effectively utilized to actually combat
corruption. Prospective countries may create “surface-level” changes during the admission
process into the EU, but fail to actually address and decrease corruption.
As expected, the Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law variables both had positive effects
on Corruption scores and were statistically significant at the 99% level. Additionally, both had
meaningful magnitudes which were moderately large. Both of these results indicate that higher
levels of Effective Governance and Rule of Law are associated with moderately higher Control
of Corruption scores.
The GDP per Capita variable was both positive and statistically significant at the 99%
level. However, GDP per Capita had a small magnitude, indicating that a higher GDP per Capita
is associated with a slighter higher Control of Corruption score.
While the magnitude is small, Nat Resources per GDP has a negative effect that is
significant at the 99% level. This is unsurprising and consistent with the literature.

Contrary to my expectations, my results indicated that the Quality of Regulation and Free
Press variables were not statistically significant. While the literature indicates that these typically
have significantly effect on reducing levels of corruption in a country, my model does not
demonstrate this. I was also surprised to see that Political Stability had a negative effect on a
country’s corruption score that was significant at the 90% level.
Interestingly, Historically Protestant has a large effect with a 99% level of significance.
This is consistent with the literature, particularly Treisman and others. It is important to note,
however, that this study encompasses a relatively short period in recent history. Thus, I cannot
conclude that a Protestant tradition is always associated with lower corruption.
I was unable to obtain data for certain likely important variables, such as salaries of public
employees. Additionally, there are certain issues involved in gauging corruption, as there is
discrepancy between what some cultures consider traditional and obligatory exchanges and what
other cultures consider corrupt practices. This may have resulted in some bias due to missing data.
The regression results indicate a very high R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared. This is due to
the fact that my variables are very general and encompass a lot of factors, which is resulting in a
very high Adjusted R-Squared. Furthermore, including regional-level fixed effects in a study with
country-level data will typically lead to a very high R-squared.
Additionally, many of these variables are quite abstract and are highly correlated with
eachother. This model thus contains a high degree of multicolinearity, especially among the 6
Worldwide Governance Indicators.

V.

Conclusion

I aim to develop the sophistication of this study in a few ways. Firstly, I would like to include
data on ethnic diversity per country, as there is research indicating that level of ethnic diversity
can increase corruption levels. I would also include data on Black Market premiums to gauge the
level of Black Market activity in each country.
Given the high degree of multicolinearity in my model, I think it would be expedient to include
a correlation matrix to ascertain the degree to which the six Worldwide Governance Indicators are
correlated with each other and the other variables.
Additionally, I am interested in running this regression with country-level fixed effects to
absorb unobservable heterogeneity between the different countries over time. These fixed effects
would account for the differences that exist between these countries that are missing in my model
due to the observations I had to drop. I did not include country-level fixed effects as this would
have consumed too many of my degrees of freedom.
Finally, I would like to address the largest problem my paper has–the lack of data that forced
me to remove several countries, particularly Mediterranean and Southeastern European states,
from my study. I would like to conduct an analysis to determine the effect of the missing
observations on my model. I will do this by creating a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the
observation for said country in said year is present, and 0 if this observation is missing. Should the
missing data prove to be significant, it will mean that this missing data is skewing my results and
the effect of my key variable.

The Greek Debt Crises created reverberations across the globe and impacted countries and
financial institutions all over the world. As the debt crisis manifested in other countries, it became
evident that the European Union had several problems that it needed to address. Corruption, a
problem which played a significant role in Europe's financial issues, continues to negatively affect
the E.U. economy today. As evidenced by my results, it appears that European Union Membership
is associated with higher levels of corruption in a country. Commissioner Malmström was correct
in stating that the E.U. needs to re-examine the process by which prospective member countries
create and adopt anti-corruption measures. Additionally, it appears that current E.U. member
nations need to scrutinize the efficacy of the anti-corruption legislation, practices, and institutions
that are already in place. Ultimately, the European Union member states and prospective members
may need to adopt new and effective ways to address this issue if they are going to effectively
eradicate corruption in a long-term and feasible manner.
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